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 Abstract 
 
Forestry supply chains are a significant part of the Swedish economy. These supply 
chains are highly susceptible to storms damage. In late 2013 Sweden was hit by multiple 
storms. This leads to the possibility to research how supply chains react to the shocks that 
storms cause. The aim of this thesis is to research the costs that storms increase, the actions 
that are taken within the forestry supply chain, as well as possible benefactors from storms. 
 
This thesis bases on previous work on supply chain mapping and cost theories. Three 
supply chains in Sweden are analyzed – Södra, SCA and Norrskog. By mapping the supply 
chain and analyzing what costs increase it is possible to get a general view of how supply 
chains react to shocks. 
 
The findings of this thesis are that storms create a tradeoff between loss of quality and 
loss of efficiency for forestry companies who work with forest owners. In all three cases 
working with reduced efficiency was preferred over losing the quality of logs. The main cause 
for the loss of efficiency is increased harvesting expenses from working with storm-felled 
logs, increased storage costs, and slightly increased costs from hiring external forestry 
workers and transporters. 
 
The main actors in dealing with effects of storms are the forestry companies. The 
actions that they take to reduce quality loss can be grouped in to three categories – 
information gathering, capacity building and negotiation. Information is continuously 
gathered on the storm-felled amount and species. Capacity is built up via hiring additional 
external forestry workers, transporters and machinery for mills. Negotiations happen with 
forest owners to put off contracts, with other mills in different regions on selling logs, and 
with the government on relaxing capacity restricting legislation. 
 
Lastly it is concluded that no parties profit from storms. Some parties gain in terms of 
work stability, the industry gains certainty of being supplied with raw materials and lastly the 
economy gains from increased business activity.  
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 Sammanfattning  
 
Skogsbrukets leverantörskedjor utgör signifikanta delar av den totala ekonomin. Dessa 
leverantörskedjor påverkas kraftigt av förödelse, till största delen stormar. I slutet av år 2013 
drabbades Sveriges skogsbruk av flertalet stormar, vilket har möjliggjort forskning på hur 
leverantörskedjan har reagerat på chockar likt stormar. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att 
undersöka de kostnader som stormar orsakar, de åtgärder som skogsbrukets leverantörskedjor 
tvingats ta på grund av stormar, liksom eventuella positiva faktorer som uppstått efter 
stormarnas framfart. 
 
Den här uppsatsen är baserad på tidigare forskning som har kartlagt leverantörskedjor 
och kostnadsteori i skogsbruket. I den här uppsatsen är tre leverantörsled analyserade från 
skogsbolagen Södra, SCA och Norrskog. Genom att kartlägga skogsbolagens 
leverantörskedjor analyserades vilken punkt av kostnadsökning som är möjlig för att ge en 
generell överblick om hur leverantörsledet reagerar på chocker.  
 
Iakttagelser i den här studien visar på att stormar skapar en kompromiss mellan 
kvalitetsförluster och förluster av effektivitet för skogsbolagen som arbetar åt privata 
skogsägare. Studien visar att i alla tre undersökningsfall var förlorad effektivitet att föredra 
över försämrad kvalité på fällt virke. Den huvudsakliga orsaken till effektivitetsförluster var 
ökade skogsmaskinskostnader vid arbete med stormfällda träd, förvaringskostnader för virke 
och till viss del ökade kostnader för inhyrning av extern skogsbrukspersonal och transporter. 
 
Det är skogsbolagen som huvudsakligen får ta konsekvenserna av stormarna. De 
främsta beslut som fattas för att reducera kvalitetsförluster kan förklaras i tre kategorier – 
informationsinsamling, kapacitetsbygge och förhandling. Informationsinsamling sker 
regelbundet av stormfällda träd av varierande arter. Kapacitetsökningen utgöras genom att 
hyra in extra arbetare, transporter och maskiner till sågverken. Skogsbolagen initierar 
förhandlingar med markägarna för att omförhandla avtal, även avtal med sågverk i olika 
regioner omförhandlas för virkesförsäljning. Till sist sker även förhandlingar med staten om 
att lösa upp strikta kapacitetslagar. 
 
Sammanfattningsvis drar ingen aktör fördelar av stormar. Några aktörer tjänar i termer 
av arbetstillfällen, branschen tjänar på säkrad tillgång av virke och till viss del skapas 
välfärdsvinster på grund av ökad affärsverksamhet. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Forestry supply chains have a very long processing time in terms of making the final product. 
A great portion of that time is spent growing the trees. During this time the forest might be 
exposed to different kinds of risks and natural disasters such as storms. None of these natural 
events can be classified as predictable – yet what is known is that they happen over time 
(Marzano et al., 2013). This means that the forestry supply chain experiences irregular shocks 
that it cannot predict. This creates losses within the chain.  
 
Storms are among the most noticeable risks that forests managers have to deal with 
(Birot & Gollier, 2001).One does not have to look far back in to the past for examples. In late 
2013 Sweden was hit by several storms: 
 
• The “St. Jude storm”, known as “Simone” in Sweden, hit Southern Sweden in 28th and 
29th of October (The Local Europe, 2013a)  
• Storm “Hilde”, which hit Northern Sweden on the 16th and 17th of November, and 
felled 3.5 million cubic meters of wood in Northern Sweden (Sveriges Radio, 2013a)  
• Storm “Sven” which hit Southern Sweden, especially Malmö and Helsingborg, and 
around the west coast of Sweden from the 5th until the 7th of December (The Local 
Europe, 2013b)  
• Storm “Ivar” which particularly affected Norrland from the 10th until the 17th of 
December and felled between 4.5 and 6.5 million cubic meters of wood (Sveriges 
Radio, 2013b)  
 
All of these events were shocks that struck supply chains. These shocks caused different 
costs that affect companies – from direct costs, like the decreased quality of timber, and 
increased costs of harvesting, to indirect costs of adjusting plans, renegotiating agreements, 
and information gathering. All of these costs together make a significant impact. 
 
1.1 Problem Background 
 
The importance of the forestry sector cannot be understated. By being a raw material for 
everyday products like furniture, houses or even energy, the forestry sector has added a lot of 
value. According to Schuck and Schelhaas (2013) -“in Europe the estimated gross value 
added of the forest sector was 120 billion EUR in 2010, contributing ~1% to the overall Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of Europe and as high as 3-5% in countries like, Finland, Latvia and 
Sweden”. According to data from the last 60 years, an average of 0.12% of total standing 
volumes is damaged annually, with wind damage being responsible for 51% of the total 
damage (Schuck & Schelhaas, 2013). This means that storm damages are the main cause of 
damages to forest stands. 
 
The most notable example in Sweden is the storm “Gudrun” that happened in January 
of 2005. The storm caused losses of 20.8 billion SEK (majority of these losses are in the form 
of forest damage) (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, 2005). Considering that Sweden’s 
GDP in 2005 was 2 907.4 billion SEK (taken at current prices) - this means that the losses 
from the storm “Gudrun” were roughly 0.7 percentage points of total GDP (Statistics Sweden, 
2015). These losses are unavoidable - the only actions that can mitigate the damage and 
reduce the impact are preventive (Broman et al., 2009). Forest loggers and nurseries might be 
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 short term beneficiaries from storms, while it should be emphasized that in the “long run” the 
whole supply chain loses (Hanewinkel & Peyron, 2013).  
 
The shocks of storms are mainly felt by the forest owners and forestry companies within 
the forestry supply chains (Broman et al., 2009). This causes the chain to react in various 
different ways, which according to supply chain theory could increase costs. An example of 
this is the bullwhip effect (Chopra & Meindl, 2013). When coordination is not done properly, 
it is enough to have small fluctuations in supply or demand to cause the bullwhip effect 
(Whang et al., 1997). A shock such as a storm may cause increases in inventory costs, 
transportation costs, labor costs, etc., all of these being born by companies within the forestry 
supply chain (Chopra & Meindl, 2013). It should be noted that there are also indirect costs 
which storms forced upon the chain. These costs are associated with planning future 
activities, and the reduction of value of damaged or undamaged stands that need to be taken 
down in the near future after the storm (Hanewinkel & Peyron, 2013). 
 
To sum up – forestry supply chains are an important part of the economy, and in recent 
history storms have caused significant shocks in these forestry supply chains. These shocks 
force actors to adjust, react and cooperate. Little is documented on the adjustment methods 
within the supply chains. This leads to a gap in the academic literature. 
 
1.2 Aim and Research Questions 
 
The importance of forestry supply chains cannot be understated. At the same time the 
academic literature is lacking is partially lacking in the area of how the chain reacts to storms. 
This is further discussed in the literature review and the method chapters of this paper. The 
aim of this paper is to explore the costs or benefits and taken actions after storms within 
forestry supply chains, in order to cover the gap in academic literature. 
 
Losses from storms are mentioned so often that it has become common knowledge. 
Often there are citations in newspapers which quote the losses that are caused by a storm, but 
these calculations are based on damaged assets, or damaged forest (Thompson et al., 2010; 
Genovese et al., 2011). This is not the same as losses that are experienced by the supply 
chain. Therefore this leads to the first research question. 
 
Research Question 1: What costs do storms increase for forestry supply chains? 
 
The increased costs cause the supply chain to react in order to minimize losses. 
Different kinds of reactions are possible depending on the specifics of the particular situation. 
The actions that are taken in the forestry supply chains have not been explored – which raises 
the second research question - on which actions in the chains are taken to adjust to shocks 
from storms? 
 
Research Question 2: What actions are taken within forestry supply chains to minimize 
the costs from storms? 
 
Shocks can cause different reactions in different parts of the supply chain – one actor’s 
reaction can influence other actors. It is possible that the reaction to the shock can give a 
chance for other actors to profit. Briefly mentioned by Hanewinkel and Peyron (2013) in their 
economic analysis - storms may increase profits in the short run for forest loggers and 
nurseries, while Schuck and Schelhaas (2013) state that it is possible for the industry which 
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 relies on raw materials from forests to gain, in the long run “all parties” lose from the shock. 
Because this phenomenon has not been explicitly researched, it leads to the third research 
question. 
 
Research Question 3: Which parts of the supply chain profit in the short run from 
shocks caused by storms? 
 
In order to answer the three research questions, the literature review introduces depth to 
the discussed issues as well as a basis for the method used in this paper. Thereafter the results 
from the applied method are described. In the end, the conclusions restate the answers to the 
research questions, as well as the extent of the achieved aim. 
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 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
In order to fulfil the aim and create an approach to answering the research questions, the 
literature review is split into three parts, each dedicated to a different subject. The first part is 
about the actors within the forestry supply chain, the second part is on storms and their 
effects, and the last part is on costs that a supply chain can experience. The literature is 
searched for and gathered by using online academic databases – Google Scholar, Primo and 
JSTOR. Articles are searched for by suing key-word relative to the thesis - 2013 storms; 
forestry supply chains; forest management; supply chain management; storm costs; storm 
effects. 
 
Before the issue of storms is discusses, it should be defined as a concept. According to 
the official historical definition wind can be called a storm when it reaches the wind velocity 
of 24.5 meters per second (Met Office, 2010). With changing wind velocity, the official 
meteorological name of the phenomenon changes. Within the context of this paper, the term 
“storm” is used loosely, and is referred to as any velocity of wind that has the capacity to 
damage forests in a significant scale, generally above 24.5 meters per second. Such a 
definition is consistent with other works in the field of risk management with forests (Birot & 
Gollier, 2001; Gardiner & Quine, 2000). 
 
2.1 Actors in Forestry Supply Chains 
 
Within the context of this report the term “supply chain” is defined as by Chopra & 
Meindl (2013). The definition is from Lee and Billington (1992), and was later adjusted by 
Christopher (1998): “The supply chain is most commonly defined as a network of actors that 
produce and deliver products to customers. In this context, the term “actors” is preferred 
over “firms” as the smallest unit of supply chains, since this draws attention to the processes 
that are performed irrespective of the ownership structure of the actors involved” (Lee & 
Billington, 1992; Christopher, 1998; Zsidisin, 2003). By using this definition it implies that 
the forestry supply chain involves all actors until the consuming customer. This is further 
discussed in chapter “3.2 Limitation”. 
 
The specifics of forestry supply chains are: (1) relatively long lead times, (2) risks in 
raw material supply and (3) the raw material generates a high amount of consequent products 
(Haartveit et al., 2004). Relatively long lead times are understood as the time it takes for the 
forest to mature. Risks in raw material supply are understood as storms, illegal felling, disease 
and other general risks to forests. A high amount of consequent products means that the 
timber and pulpwood can be developed to products in vastly different types, sizes, colors. 
Each of these dimensions means that the end product is different, while the inputs remain the 
same. 
 
According to Haartveit et al. (2004) there are two popular methods of mapping a supply 
chain. The two methods are the “structural mapping method” and the “lead time method”. The 
first focuses on material flow in the chain (starting from raw materials to the end product). 
The second focuses on lead time mapping (starting from the product, mapped by time spent in 
production). Haartveit et al. (2004) concluded that the structural mapping method is more 
effective in describing forestry supply chains, because of the high amount of consequent 
products, which makes it complicated to illustrate it in lead time mapping. The result of the 
“structural mapping method” is illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Within the structural mapping method the relationships are described by good flows. 
The different good flow types in supply chains are illustrated in Appendix 1. These different 
kinds of relationship types are used to explain why the focus on the forestry companies within 
the forestry supply chain. This is further discussed in the methodology. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 -Generalized representation of material flows and relationships in forestry industry 
supply chains (intermediaries are excluded to reduce complexity); Created by Haartveit et al. 
(2004). 
 
The result of Haartveit, et al., (2004), can be seen in Figure 1 – an illustration of the 
structure of the forestry supply chain. The increasing number of consequent goods can be well 
observed by many V-type material flows. In order to make a better illustration the 
intermediaries are not included, as it would drastically increase complexity, thus reducing the 
clarity of the representation (Haartveit, et al., 2004).  
 
The intermediaries that are not represented in Figure 1 should not be ignored. An 
example of the intermediaries is seedling production, forest work, transportation and 
insurance, but can also include other actors (Sinclair, 1992). To sum up – the forestry supply 
chain consists of log manufacturing (which can also be described as forest owners), the 
intermediaries (transport, cutting, etc.), processing (for pulp and paper, for lumber and for 
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 burning (energy)), which leads to the final product that is then be sold to an intermediary, and 
then to the final customer (Sinclair, 1992). 
 
During status quo, when there are no storms effects, within the supply chain, decisions 
of individual actors are often based on cost minimizations – therefore it is possible to 
maximize the total profits of the supply chain through coordination, information sharing and 
setting of correct incentives (Chopra & Meindl, 2013). These individual decisions are mostly 
in the form of optimal solution of sub-problems, such as minimum roadside, mill-site costs or 
transportation costs (Haartveit, et al., 2004). An additional characteristic which is important in 
understanding the forestry supply chain is that it can be described as driven by pull factors – 
the forest owner is motivated by push factors, but the rest of the chain respond to actual 
demand (Sinclair, 1992; Chopra & Meindl, 2013).  
 
2.2 Effects of Storms 
 
To understand the impacts of storms, it is first necessary to shortly describe storm 
mechanics, and there afterwards describe the effects that storms have in general on forestry 
supply chains. The example of storm “Gudrun” will be used to illustrate shocks. It should be 
noted that storm “Gudrun” was more severe than the storm that took place in 2013. 
 
A storm in this case, is caused by changes in atmospheric pressure. This change of 
pressure leads to wind currents which have changing characteristics, such as changing speed, 
direction and frequency. Storms can be damaging when the instantaneous wind load is strong 
enough to exceed a limit which breaks the structural integrity of wood (Brunet, 2013). It 
should be noted that it differs for different species of trees (ibid.). Thus for assessment of how 
damaging a storm is, one should not pay as much attention to the mean wind speed, but to 
how turbulent the wind is and what is its’ maximum speed (Peltola et al., 2013) (Brunet, 
2013) (Birot & Gollier, 2001). Also wind gusts affect different areas with different intensity, 
for example forest edges, hills, varying tree species, or forests with varying height of trees 
(Brunet, 2013). This means that proper forest management has significant effects on forest 
susceptibility to storms (Schuck & Schelhaas, 2013).  
 
When storms do hit, there are significant changes that are automatically forced on the 
supply chain. Forestry companies have spent significant effort to develop extensive models 
and plans that deal with logistics and forestry work – after a storm these plans are made 
obsolete (Broman et al., 2009). Broman et al. (2009) helped develop a model to optimize 
transportation after storm Gudrun in 2005 based on four variables - harvesting capacity, 
transportation capacity, storage costs and demand of logs. They state that transportation is the 
most constraining factor after storms. A additional issue that a storms initially forces to 
resolve is information acquiring – amounts of wind felled volumes, harvesting capacities at 
different sites, transportation capacity, demand from customers (mills) and storage issues 
(ibid.). These issues correspond to the possible cost increases defined by Chopra and Meindl 
(2013), which are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
According to Broman et al., (2009) after storm Gudrun the main issues that forestry 
companies had to deal with were storage and transportation. With storage it was possible to 
find “creative” solutions, such as using lakes and abandoned airfields. It should be noted that 
timber, if stored properly and watered regularly, can be stored between two to three years. If 
timber is not collected quick enough, then it creates losses as quality drops in processing, 
which affects the price of the timber. The most cost effective method for collection is to use 
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 harvesters and forwarders, and while there was a shortage of these, this was made up by 
employing them from other regions, that is why it was not an issue. Broman et al. (2009) state 
that transportation was a more difficult issue to solve because of its increased complexity. 
Logs had to be transported from different areas to different storage points, and afterwards to 
different mills, with the possibility of other modes of transportation such as rail or boat, being 
used in the middle. To get the immense volumes of logs to the right places, transporters from 
different parts of Sweden as well as other countries were employed as additional labor. 
 
To sum up this chapter - Schuck and Schelhaas (2013) note that forest management 
practices have a huge impact on forest susceptibility of storms. They define storms as “highly 
stochastic and relatively rare events”, which means that time-series data analysis does not 
work well in forecasting these events (Schuck & Schelhaas, 2013). When a storms does strike 
the industries that are most affected are the forest owners, the forestry companies, the 
transporters and the providers of storage (Broman et al. 2009; Hanewinkel & Peyron, 2013). 
Extreme leanness and efficiency can lead to increased vulnerability within firms and supply 
chains (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). These different degrees of susceptibility and efficiency, 
with an introduced shock from a storm lead to cost increases. 
 
2.3 Costs in the Supply Chain 
 
When researching costs within a supply chain it is important to outline that the costs 
that are the focus of the research are “abnormal” or “additional”. This means that costs, which 
the supply chain experiences regardless of shocks, are not taken in to account. Within this 
subheading two costs types are discussed, as well as a theory supply chain processes.   
 
The first types of costs are direct costs. These are additional expenses that the chain is 
forced to experience to continue operations (Christopher, 1998). Chopra and Meindl (2013) 
list the possible direct costs: 
 
• Manufacturing costs – to adapt to variability, the manufacturing equipment has to be 
able to work with both higher and lower frequencies. This applied to harvesting and 
processing. This means that technology needs to have higher capacity, and sometimes, 
be run below capacity; 
• Inventory costs – because of the shocks, different amounts of inventories will be held 
to continue operations. This increases inventory costs - as more physical space is 
needed for the inventory, or the opposite - space which is reserved for inventories 
remains unused. 
• Transportation costs – shocks can change the amount of goods transported, or 
transportation distance. Additionally it can be necessary to hire extra transport capacity 
or the opposite – have transport capacity which is not used. 
• Replenishment lead time – because of the shocks, companies tend to restock less often 
and hold higher inventories. This increases replenishment lead time which makes 
scheduling the next time to restock more difficult.  
• Labor costs – in order manage the shocks, overtime might be used. Shocks can increase 
or decrease the planned amount of labor, thus resulting in either excess capacity or lack 
of it.  
• Relationships across the supply chain – during a shock when the supply chain is less 
coordinated there exists a tendency to put the blame on other parts of the supply chain, 
thus stressing the relationships between adjacent actors.  
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 • Product availability – shocks make it harder to supply all of the customers 
simultaneously, thus as a consequence, the amount of different products can be 
decreased in order to cope. 
 
The second type of costs that can occur is best described as coordination costs. While 
coordination costs can result in direct costs, as described above, these costs are theoretically 
avoidable by coordinating between actors more efficiently. Miss-coordination can happen if 
different parts of the chain work separately and have different objectives (Chopra & Meindl, 
2013).  According to Chopra and Meindl (2013) the causes for a lack of coordination are: 
local optimization; sales incentives; forecasting based on orders and not customer demand; 
lack of information sharing; price fluctuations. The results of a lack of coordination can often 
be observed as the “bullwhip” effect. A bullwhip effect is defined as: “when the variability of 
demand orders in the supply chain is amplified as it is moved up the supply chain. Distorted 
information from one end of a supply chain to the other can lead to tremendous inefficiencies 
(Whang et al., 1997).  
 
Another important factor that should be noted is whether the supply chain is driven by 
“push” or “pull” processes. A pull process is defined as “being initiated by a customer’s order 
(a reactive process)” and a push process is defined as “being initiated as anticipation of 
customer orders (a speculative/proactive process)” (Chopra & Meindl, 2013). The main 
difference between two is the knowledge of customer demand for the good. Different actors 
in the same supply chain can be driven by different processes. This is an important addition in 
understand the position of individual actors in a chain. 
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 3 Method 
 
The method which is chosen to answer the research questions should be based on 
methods that are used in the research field (Yin, 2013). Basing upon other the methods used 
by other researchers is thus considered as a safe approach to tackle the problem. In order to 
answer the three research questions, first it is necessary to map a supply chain. The method of 
structural mapping is chosen from the paper by Haartveit et al. (2004). The illustration from 
figure two is used as a basis to describe forestry supply chains. Additionally the same authors 
use a descriptive case-study approach to each supply chain (Haartveit et al., 2004). This 
approach is supported by Hanewinkel and Peyron (2013), who state that “A storm leads to a 
sequence of impacts within the forest/wood sector, which can be qualitatively described, but 
for which a quantitative evaluation of the economic impact is often hard to make.” Thus a 
case-study approach is chosen. This implies an inductive approach to solving the problem and 
generalizing the conclusions 
 
This method is based on the approach used by Haartveit et al. (2004), where the authors 
map forestry supply chains using semi-structured interviews. Such semi-structured interviews 
are preferred as actors in different parts of the supply chain have knowledge about different 
functions, and possibly have different experiences dealing with the fallout from storms. 
Interviews in general are a notable source of information in case studies (Robson, 2011). The 
approach can be classified as a multiple case-study approach (Yin, 2013). Single cases studies 
are riskier, and are only suggested when going in depth of very specific issues, thus a multiple 
case study is preferable as it avoids sample dependence. Having multiple points of view can 
give additional insight in to the problem (ibid.). It should be noted that fully structured 
interviews are not preferred because they would have to be differentiated for each actor in the 
chain, which would require considerably more input and thus result in fewer interviews done. 
Additionally this would lead to an increase of the risk that the results are sample dependent. 
 
The semi-structure interviews are conducted using an interview guide which can be 
found in Appendix 2. The interview guide has four main topics that are based on the literature 
review:  
 
• Map of the supply chain – This area of the interview guide is based on Haartveit, et al. 
(2004) and the structural mapping method. It checks for relationships between actors in 
the supply chain and also the amount of different actors that are adjacent, as well as the 
main activities. The questions add to understanding the structural map of the supply 
chain, in case actors that are not mentioned in the literature play a significant role. 
• Storms and their effects – In the paper by Broman et al., (2009) it is noted that a focus 
should be put on storage and transportation expenses. The questions about damaged 
wood and capacity change are based on Hanewinkel and Peyron (2013). The questions 
on coordination during storms are based on Birot and Gollier (2001). Additionally 
variable usage in capacity can be in indicator of the bullwhip effect based on Whang et 
al. (1997) and Chopra and Meindl (2013). 
• Costs - This part focuses on costs in the supply chain as described by Chopra and 
Meindl (2013). Additional questions are included to understand the extent or 
importance of the costs relative to each other. Also these same questions address the 
issue of push and pull factors. 
• Reaction - This is a more general part and includes issues that are previously not 
covered - such as possible actions taken, usage of forecasting and collaboration. This is 
based on Chopra and Meindl (2013) as possible solutions to bad coordination. 
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3.1 Answering the Research Questions  
 
To answer the research questions  three actors from Sweden’s forestry supply chains are 
selected – “Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget” (henceforth referred to as SCA); Norrskog; 
Södra. According to Broman et al., (2009) these are forestry companies who deal with the 
fallout of storms. Forestry companies are selected because within the supply chain they 
function as a V type of supplier and as an A type of customer (according to Appendix 1), thus 
they are bottlenecks – which makes it easier to take them as a basis for a supply chain. 
Additionally these organizations hold positions in their respective supply chains that force 
them to deal with fallout from storms (Broman et al., 2009). The selection of these three 
forestry companies is based on data availability – the available contacts at the time, and on the 
responsiveness of the companies’ representatives. Semi-structured interviews are then 
conducted with the people in key management positions, and afterwards actors from other 
functional units within the chain are interviewed using the snowballing method – by getting 
contact information from the initial interviewee. The contacts in the different points of the 
supply chain are forest owners, producers of seedlings, managers of logistics, mill and plant 
managers. These interviews serve as the main source of data. By understanding the different 
points of view from the actors it is possible to gain an understanding of which costs increase 
and why, which allows answering the first research question:” What costs do storms increase 
for forestry supply chains?”. 
 
A total of 10 interviews are conducted with people who work at different parts of the 
chain. A list of all interviewees and their contact information can be found in Appendix 3. 
The storms which are used as a reference point in the interviews are the storms of 2013 
described in the introduction. In the results and analysis part of the work when referring to 
storms, it is generally understood as the storms that affected the organizations within 2013. 
Due to the massive influence of storm Gudrun which struck Sweden in 2005, it is also 
mentioned as a reference point in the interviews (Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological 
Institute, 2011). In text storm Gudrun will be explicitly referenced. Otherwise in general text 
storms from 2013 are the subject.  
 
To answer the second research question “What actions are taken within the forestry 
supply chain to minimize the costs from storms?” the interviews include questions on reaction 
by different actors in the supply chain. These actions are explained as relative to a scenario 
where the supply chain is not affected by a storm. These questions include actions taken by all 
of the parts of the supply chain. The restrictions to the length of the researched part of the 
supply chain are described in detailed under the subheading “3.2 Limitations”. 
 
To answer the third research question “Which parts of the supply chain profit in the 
short run from shocks caused by storms?” questions are included in the interview guide. 
Because the different actors are able to identify the costs and price changes, the actors should 
be aware if adjacent actors gain or lose from storms.  Financial reports are not used because of 
multiple issues, which are addressed under the subheading “3.2 Limitations”. 
 
Because of the difference in size of the companies, different amounts of interviews are 
conducted within each of the three supply chains. The interviews are conducted in person as 
well as via telephone, depending on the time availability of the person, as well as 
geographical distance. The interviews are conducted in a similar structure for all persons, 
while focusing in on the parts where the person had more experience and also depending on 
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 which positions that person would hold. The interviewee received the information on the 
topics beforehand in order to be able to prepare answers. The interviews are recorded, while 
the interviewee is assured that in case sensitive material is brought up then it is possible to not 
answer a question. In case after the interview there is a need to clarify an issue or a question 
needed looking in to, it is done over e-mail. 
 
3.1.1 Data Quality and Assurance 
 
When interviews are used as a main source of data, the quality of those interviews is of 
utmost importance to getting results (Robson, 2011; Yin, 2013). The three sources of data 
quality for this research are experience, transparency and comparability. The study bases on 
these three reasons as the pillars to be sure of the quality of work. 
 
As stated before – interviews are the main source of data. These interviews within 
forestry supply chains happen with individuals who had recently experienced working with 
fallout from storms. Because these are not randomly selected, and are specifically related to 
working with storm shocks, means that the information is relevant and current. This should be 
sufficient to assure internal validity in terms observing a “cause” and an “effect” and there 
relations (Shadish et al., 2002). This is a significant determinant for internal validity (Yin, 
2013). Regarding external validity (Shadish et al., 2002) there are different components of the 
that can be generalized to different extents. The extent of which these different can be 
generalizes are based on  Robson’s (2011) notion that three degrees of generalization are to be 
taken in to account - industry wise, country wise and to other research field. 
 
The interviews are based on the notion of transparency – which is a critical component 
of for any research (Robson, 2011). All of the participants are informed and had to agree to 
the possibility that their statements could be published. The list of interviewees and their 
contacts can be found in Appendix 3. Transcripts are done after every interview, and used in 
when looking at specific topics. This gives additional reliability to the interviews, in the form 
of recalling information. As such recording information is a part of a technique to establish 
reliability (Yin, 2011). 
 
The third basis of reliability is the basis on multiple cases. By analyzing three supply 
chains there is a decrease on sample dependence, which is a risk in all research (Shadish et al., 
2002). These three supply chains are competitors, and operate similarly – the activities taken 
within one of the cases would not impact the others, thus it can be considered that they are not 
interdependent. 
 
The three pillars – experience of interviewees, transparency and multiple cases – assure 
that the research is internally valid (Shadish et al., 2002). By interviewing persons who are 
experienced the fallouts of storms, the action and cost observations have a causal link, thus 
the study has temporal precedence and covariation. By emphasizing transparency and 
analyzing multiple supply chains, it is possible to establish, that other alternative 
explanations, which do not appear in the case, are not viable. This establishes 
nonspuriousness, which in turn means the study is internally valid (ibid.). Lastly basing the 
method on previous studies, and adjusting it based on different framework suggestions 
(Robson, 2011; Yin, 2013) ensures that the study has construct validity (Westen & Rosenthal, 
2003). 
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 3.1.2 Ethical Considerations 
 
There are three main considerations that should be taken into account when using 
interviews as a part of the research method - confidentiality, informed consent and 
consequences for the interviewee (Kvale, 1996). All three aspects are taken into account 
within this thesis. All 10 of the interviewees are informed beforehand, and also during the 
start of the interview what it will be about and what it will be used for, thus ensuring informed 
consent. Confidentiality is taken into account by informing the interviewees that the results of 
the interviews will be made public, and thus any information that is confidential could be 
omitted. No interviewee used this option. Lastly, the consequences for the interviewee – 
negative consequences can happen if the interviewee presents negative information on their 
peers within the supply chain or the company itself. Firstly, this is partially addressed by 
having the interview questions formulated in such a way as to emphasize a general situation 
with storms (taking the storms of 2013 as an example). This avoids pinpointing individuals 
within the chain. Secondly the risk that the individual might have negative possible 
consequences regarding relationships within the organization he/she is working for is not fully 
avoided. No such information was received at the interviews. 
 
According to Robson (2011), informed consent with transparency can lead to 
diminished data quality. This is can lead to interviewees withholding information that could 
put them in a negative setting. Robson (2011) states that it is of key importance that ethical 
considerations come first before the quality of data.  For this reason the study is done with 
having the interviewees and their public contact information listed in Appendix 3. Thus the 
accountability is preferred to data quality.  
 
3.1.3 Case Profiles 
 
The three supply chains that are researched are based around forestry organizations that 
forest owners sell their timber to. As stated before this is because they are the key actors that 
deal with storm fallout (Broman et al., 2009). The three organizations are SCA, Södra and 
Norrskog. 
 
“Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget” or SCA is hygiene and forest product company 
(SCA, 2015). It is owned by various different stockholders, as its stocks are sold on 
Stockholm’s Stock Exchange – NASDAQ OMX Nordic. It has around 46 100 employees 
worldwide. For this specific case only a part of SCA’s activities are looked at – specifically 
activities in Sweden’s region of Medelpad, Ångermanland, Norrbotten, Västerbotten and 
Jämtland (ibid.). Within these regions SCA is a forest owner and additionally it works with 
the independent forest owners of the region in buying timber and pulp wood. SCA owns a 
paper mill, a pulp mill, two paperboard mills and works in five saw mills (Henrik Sakari, 
2015). This means that SCA owns large parts of the supply chain with regards to Figure 1 – 
from parts of the log manufacturing, to pulp as well as paper manufacturing and processing, 
to distribution.  The sales of SCA’s products are conducted in more than 100 countries around 
the world. The company experienced storm damage during the end of 2013, when Hilde and 
Ivar caused 3 million and 7 million m3 of damage respectively. Out of the 10 million m3 of 
damaged timber 4 million m3 were on SCA’s forests (ibid.). 
 
 Södra is an economic association of more than 50 000 forest owners in Southern 
Sweden, who own more than half of all privately owned forest land in the region. Södra is 
based on maximizing the profitability for the forest owners by providing services such as 
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 consulting, and processing of raw materials (Södra, 2014). The association owns 3 pulp mills, 
12 saw mills and employs 3 500 people. For this specific case the interviews are conducted 
with the part of Södra that operates in the South of Sweden – namely around Växjö, Ljungby, 
Långasjö, Ronneby, Broby and Höör. Within these regions Södra operates in the part of the 
supply chain the works with processing the logs and pulp (see Figure 2), and selling the 
product to manufacturers (Calle Nordqvist, 2015). The products are then sold to the industries 
which are willing to pay the most – the biggest markets being Sweden and Europe. Södra was 
affected by storms Simone and Sven in late 2013, which resulted in 1 to 1.5 million m3 of 
timber being damaged on the lands of Södra’s members (ibid.).  
 
Norrskog operates similarly to Södra - it is a Swedish economic association of around 
13 000 forest owners in Jämtland, Medelpad, Ångermanland and South Lappland. The 
principles of operation are to maximize the profit for its members by giving consultations, 
assisting in sales, and owning mills. It employs around 300 people, making it the smallest of 
the three organizations within this research (Norrskog, 2015). It owns 3 sawmills and 2 timber 
processing mills within the region. Norrskog works with its own forest owners as well as 
working with independent forest owners in the regions, thus being competition to SCA. The 
products are then sold to the industry of Sweden and Europe. Similarly to SCA, the storms 
that affected Norrskog – being Hilde and Ivar, which at the end of 2013 caused around 1.5 
million m3 of timber being damaged (Olof Falkstrom, 2015). 
 
3.2 Limitations 
 
There are three main limitations to the chosen method and an additional consideration 
that is taken into account. The three limitations are with regards to using the interview 
method, set boundaries of the supply chain, and with the generalizability of the conclusions. 
The additional consideration that is taken in to account is using financial reports as an 
additional data source. 
 
The method of using interviews has fundamental weaknesses with regards to multiple 
aspects. Firstly the “interviewer” effect should be noted. Because the interviewee is 
representing his/her company or work, it is likely that the information can be manipulated in 
the favor of creating a good image for the interviewee. This might drastically affect the 
answers regarding possible improvements, or in case mistakes were made in the process of 
dealing with the fallout. This is taken in to account when forming the interview guide, so that 
the questions are formulated in a more indirect way as “what were the lessons learnt from the 
storm?” and “How was forecasting adjusted?”. An additional weakness of the interview 
method is that the questions are formulated for the period of late 2013 (and in some cases for 
early 2014) – this means that some time has passed since the events have occurred. The 
interviewee might be since, but significant details might be forgotten over time. Thus there is 
risk that significant details might be omitted. 
 
The second limitation to using the selected method is the set boarders of the supply 
chain. There are many actors that are involved in the forestry supply chain and the number 
increases when discussing the effects of storms. The limits of the mapped supply chain in this 
case are starting from the forest owner and ending with the processor or timber, including as 
many intermediaries as possible. The chosen limits are similar to those set by Haartveit et al. 
(2004), where such actors as storms insurers or governmental agencies are not looked at more 
closely. The reason for not researching past processors is due to restrictions of time as well as 
a more limited impact from storms.  
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The third limit is the generalizability of the conclusions. The three supply chains that 
are taken might not be a good representative of the general population.  Because the actors in 
these supply chains are more responsive, it might correlate with the chain being more 
“efficient” or might have other unobserved characteristics in common that affect the results. 
Additionally the governance and laws of the state apply to many aspects within the supply 
chain (further elaborated on in the analysis), which means that the conclusions are limited to 
Sweden. As Robson (2011) points out it is highly important to take three factors in to account 
– generalization industry wise, country wise and generalization to other research field. The 
conclusions take into account these three possible factors. 
 
Regarding usage of financial reports of companies – the information from annual 
reports is used as a source of information before the interview. It should be stressed that 
annual reports are reviewed for backing up the statements made by company representatives, 
but are omitted from contributing to the results because of data aggregation. It is not possible 
to determine the costs of specific activities, mentioned in the interviews, from the companies’ 
reports due to this data aggregation and, due to contracts being activity based, and not time 
based. This means that a yearly perspective does not accurately represent the actual activities. 
Storm fallout can also be cleared over a course of multiple years. For this very same reason 
annual reports are not used to answer the third research question on actor profitability. 
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 4 Results 
 
This chapter provides insight in to how forestry activities are conducted, what do the 
supply chains look like, what are the similarities and differences between the three cases, and 
what are the costs incurred by the supply chains from storms. A model is developed to help to 
explain the relationships between actors in the supply chain. At the end of the chapter the 
most significant cost increases are outlined. The information within this chapter provides a 
basis upon which the analysis is conducted and the research questions are answered.  
  
4.1 The process  
 
In order to provide an insight into the whole forestry supply chain, a model is developed 
to help the reader understand the whole process and the subsequent analysis. The model tries 
to incorporate all of the involved actors that play a role in the construction of the end product. 
The resulting model differs slightly from the model proposed by Haartveit et al. (2004), as 
certain actors within that model are not given appropriate weight and are left out, while other 
actors are aggregated to simplify the model. 
 
4.1.1 Illustration of the Forestry Supply Chain 
 
In the literature review the work of Haartveit et al. (2004) outlined the forestry supply 
chain by using structural mapping. This model, as seen in Figure 1, ignored multiple 
intermediaries in order to reduce complexity, as well as to better illustrate it. Some of these 
intermediaries are of importance to understanding the effects regarding to storms. For this 
reason I introduce a simple model in Figure 2 which reduces the complexity in terms of 
number of actors (compared to Haartveit et al. (2004)) while at the same time illustrating the 
parts of the chain that have not been shown before. 
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- Core parts of the SC  - Optional parts of the SC 
  - Limits of Storm Effects  - Repeated processing of materials 
 
Figure 2 – Illustration of the Forestry Supply Chain and its different parts; Separation 
between core parts and optional parts; Created by Author. 
 
The model in Figure 2 simplifies the forestry supply chain, by illustrating it from the 
point of view of a single forest owner. It is based on the model proposed by Haartveit et al. 
(2004). The difference is in grouping several of the proposed actors together. It should be 
noted that different parts are meant to be independent actors or companies, but can sometimes 
be incorporated in to a single actor, similar as in the definition of supply chain management. 
For example it is possible that the forest owner offsets the risk of storms by buying insurance 
form an insurance provider – or he/she can take the risk of storms themselves thus removing 
the need of the actor in the chain. Similarly the forest owner in the chain can own the 
transportation or felling/harvesting machinery. 
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 The model is different from the model proposed by Haartveit et al. (2004), as it 
excludes the divergence of a single product in to multiple products – for example trees grown 
by a single forestry owner can be used to produce timber of different dimensions and different 
kinds of pulp – thus making this model more understandable for the reader. Additionally this 
model includes parts of the chain that were omitted for reasons of simplifying it – namely the 
measurement of logs, insurance providers, seedling producers, forest loggers (part of log 
production), storage and transportations companies. These actors are included because of their 
significance in working with fallout from storms. The purpose of this model is to make it 
easier to understand the supply chain relative to the highly branched model proposed by 
Haartveit et al. (2004). 
 
4.1.2 Activities in the Supply Chain 
 
The activities in the supply chain which cannot be avoided are defined as core activities. 
The activities that are complementary or are often done by other actors in the chain are 
defined as optional parts of the supply chain. This distinction is necessary to understand that 
there are cases where independent forest owner do some of the activities that at other times 
are done by the forestry company. 
 
1. Forest owners, insurance providers, seedling producers 
 
According to Lars Bergman (2015), an independent forest owner, and Henrik Sakari 
(2015), from SCA, there are different kinds of forest owners. They vary depending on how 
much of the onsite work is done. Some forest owners take up the risk of fire and storms upon 
themselves, while others buy insurance from insurance providers. Similarly – some of the 
forests are regrown naturally, with the seeds from the nearby forest stand, while other forest 
owners choose to buy seedlings from seedling providers, and plant them. There are some 
forest owners who have their own harvesters and forwarders, but this accounts for less than 
1% of all forest owners (pers.com., Sakari, 2015). Because this number is relatively small, 
forestry logging can be considered as being a different part of the chain, which is done 
separately from the forest owner. 
 
2. Forest logging  and forest companies 
 
After a forest is in a condition that is fit for felling, the forest owner can contract a 
company that deals with forest felling and try to do everything independently from a forestry 
company or he/she can sign a contract with a forestry company that will arrange the details of 
particular forest – sales, transportation and felling (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015; pers.com., 
Sakari, 2015; pers.com., Henckel, 2015). The forest owner can effectively replace the forestry 
company with their own activities, but he/she is less efficient in doing so. The work required 
in dealing with individual forest stands is more systematic and effective for forestry 
companies that specifically deal with such concerns (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015). Contracts 
with the forest owners are made for a period of time – the forest company arranges to have the 
forest felled within 3 to 5 years and pays the forest owner after the felling (pers.com., 
Nordqvist, 2015; pers.com., Sakari, 2015; pers.com., Falkeström, 2015). After the forest is 
felled the logs are stored by the roadside to be picked up by the transporters. 
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 3. Transportation 
 
The next step after the timber or pulp wood is felled and placed by the roadside is to 
transport it to the mill for measuring. It should be noted that in all cases transportation is a 
service that all parties outsourced. SCA, Norsskog and Södra outsource most of the 
transportations to smaller local companies (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015; pers.com., Sakari, 
2015; pers.com., Henckel, 2015). 
 
4. Measurement and mills 
 
Measuring takes place in the mill before storage, and processing. The timber 
measurement association works as an auditor that approves that a certain amount of timber 
and pulp wood is felled and is of a certain quality. It also gathers data so that there would be 
information available on a country level with regards to felling. According to Swedish law, all 
timber that is felled must be measured by these certified agencies (pers.com., Blixt, 2015; 
pers.com., Oscarsson, 2015; pers.com.,  Huittinen, 2015). After the measurements are taken, 
the logs are stored near the saw or pulp mill for processing. Sometimes the logs are stored, 
and sold from one organization to another – in the end it is still processed at one or another 
mill. In the mills the logs are stored and sorted in piles with specific machinery. The logs are 
watered with on-site machinery to maintain their quality and avoid fungus and bark beetles 
(pers.com., Oscarson, 2015). The storage of logs has been optimized throughout time, which 
means that the storage space has been decreased to lower costs, and coordination on how 
much timber is felled has been increasing (ibid.). Currently a mill can sustain itself for around 
one week without receiving new shipments of raw material (pers.com., Huittinen, 2015). 
Regarding timber there are many different dimensions that the timber is cut in. This has to do 
with width and thickness (typical examples are 16mm x100mm; 50mm x100mm). The same 
applies to pulpwood – there are different kinds of mixtures pulpwood can be made into, while 
not as varying as timber products. This is best illustrated in Figure 1 where there is great 
divergence from a single product (timber or pulpwood) to many different products. 
Afterwards the timber is dried and graded, while the paste is stored. When enough similar 
types of processed materials are in storage, they are packaged with local machinery and then 
sent for further processing (pers.com., Oscarson, 2015). 
 
5. Further processing, manufacturing and transportation and sales 
 
From the mills the materials can then be taken to different processors, such as paper 
mills, furniture producers, building material producers, etc. (pers.com., Huittinen, 2015). This 
is where the traceability within the supply chains gets complicated, as the materials at this 
point are sold all across the world – with Norrskog selling their products to 20 different 
countries, Södra to more than a 150, and SCA to even more than that (pers.com., Nordqvist, 
2015; pers.com., Sakari, 2015; pers.com., Henckel, 2015). As is explained within the next 
subheading – storms have little effect at this point, in terms of supplying the chain with 
material. Also there are no interviews done past the point of processing within the supply 
chain. 
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 4.2 Effects of Storms on the Supply Chain 
 
In order to illustrate how storms affect supply chains, the previous chapter was used to 
show how the chain operates in status quo. This chapter will address the supply chain in 
similar order, starting from the beginning of the chain, and will focus on how storms disrupt 
the supply chain. This chapter will mention what actions are taken to reduce the impacts of 
storms – a fuller description on actions taken is found within the next chapter. 
 
1. Forest owners, insurance providers, seedling producers 
 
When a storm hits, the forest owner is the first to feel the effects. If the owner is not a 
part of a forest owner association, or does not have an existing contract for felling, all the 
fallout has to be dealt with by him/herself. Contract for felling are usually made for 3 to 5 
years and during this time the company deals with the storm risk, which also includes the 
costs of replanting after the forest is cleared (pers.com., Andersson, 2015). The forest 
companies get in contact with all of the members who could be affected and ask if they need 
help in harvesting or with advice (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015). Afterwards more precise 
information is gathered on precisely how many storm-felled trees are there and a plan is made 
on how and when it will be harvested. If the damaged volumes are small then it doesn’t pay 
off to call in a harvester. Thus a forest owner might choose to take care of the storm-felled 
timber themselves. For the ones that decided to do it themselves a contract is made for the 
delivery of the timber at a certain time, place and amount. It should be noted that the storm 
damage varies from case to case. According to Ville Huittinen (2015), the variation can start 
from a loss of 10% in the value and can go up to 60% of the value for affected forests. 
 
Even if the owner is a part of a forest owner association, if there is less than 100 m3 then 
the forest owner has to pay extra to help collect it (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015). The law in 
Sweden states that spruce timber and pulp has to be brought to the mills before the end of 
June; otherwise it must remain in its place until next year, when it can be picked up after 
winter. This means there is a time limit on when it can be collected. One of the bigger costs is 
when the timber just lays in the forest for a year, because it is badly stored- and thus it gets 
moldy, as well as infested with bark beetles which lower the timbers quality (pers.com., 
Oscarson, 2015). The cost of having the logs lying around far outweighs the extra costs of the 
operations, because afterwards it cannot be sold as a fresh product (pers.com.,Oscarson, 
2015). Mainly all of these costs fall on the forest owner (pers.com., Henckel, 2015). It should 
be noted that usually forest owners want to harvest more than is just storm-felled, but this is 
not preferable to the forest companies, as there is already a lot of available timber, thus 
negotiations happen (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015). If there is a valid reason why standing 
volumes need to be cut, a separate contract for felled timber and standing timber is made 
(ibid.).  Contracts with other forest owners who do not have storm felled logs are put on hold, 
and the forest company forbids its members to cut existing trees (pers.com., Falkeström, 
2015).  
 
2. Forest logging and forest companies 
 
Because contracts at some parts are put on hold forest working teams with forest 
machinery have to be moved around. Teams from other regions that are not affected by the 
storm are generally a source of additional labor and machinery that is required (pers.com., 
Nordqvist, 2015; pers.com., Sakari, 2015; pers.com., Henckel, 2015). As stated before – 
logging can happen all year around, but storm felled logs have to be picked up until the end of 
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 June, which can cause quality issues for the logs. While quality issues are a part of the costs, 
they are relatively small compared to other costs (pers.com., Huittinen, 2015). The losses 
during storms come from harvesting and forwarding because trees are felled over large 
concentrated area, which increases the needed time to gather the timber, fuel costs and 
depreciation (pers.com., Henckel, 2015). Most of the forests that are storm-felled are old 
forests and are close to final felling (pers.com., Sakari, 2015). It takes ~15% more time to 
harvest a standing forest compared to a wind felled forest (ibid.). Generally working in forests 
that are storm-felled lowers efficiency up to 50% of the working machinery and personal 
because the storm-felled trees are located over bigger area (pers.com., Falkstrom, 2015).This 
means that the harvesters have to spend more time driving to a point and back. This is why 
extra capacity is needed after storms (pers.com., Söderström, 2015). Most forest owners are 
insured for storm damage, and it covers the costs of harvesting and forwarding to the road 
(pers.com., Falkeström, 2015). Broken logs can cause losses, because the machinery has to 
pick up multiple pieces which otherwise would have been a single log. While the pieces are 
smaller there had been no losses for the mills because of it (ibid.).  
 
3. Transportation 
 
Trucks have to be instructed to transport the trees to new destinations because the forest 
companies look for new markets of pulpwood and timber by selling it to other sawmills in 
other areas (pers.com., Falkeström, 2015) This is done because there are generally more logs 
than the mills can handle. At this point it is possible that trains or ships are hired to transport 
the logs to a new destination (pers.com., Sakari, 2015). Another possible action by the forest 
companies is to communicate with the governmental agencies, to temporarily change 
restrictive laws (pers.com., Sakari, 2015). There are the regulations that state the amount that 
can be loaded in the trucks and the amount of hours a driver can drive per day. For a limited 
time these restrictions can be reduced. Also it is possible that incentives are put in places to 
promote weekend driving to increase the capacity of transportation, which is not done during 
status quo times (ibid.). 
 
4. Measurement and mills 
 
While the forestry teams relocate and start working there is a short period of time when 
there is a strong decrease of logs supplied to the mills. Depending on each mill individually, 
the average amount that a can continue working on the material that is in storage is one week 
(pers.com., Huittinen, 2015). Afterwards there is a very big increase in the amount of logs that 
need to be measured (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015). In this case the measurement agency can 
choose to speed up the process, by having the measurers evaluate all of the wood of a truck in 
a single go (this is generally done for pulpwood, but not for timber), thus increasing the speed 
of measuring. There is no change in quality of the wood from the perspective of the State 
Measuring Agencies (pers.com., Oscarson, 2015). 
 
The amount of timber supplied to pulp mills and sawmills drops slightly while 
machinery relocates. Afterwards there is a large surplus of timber and pulpwood (even with it 
being exported to other mills in other regions) (pers.com., Oscarson, 2015). Thus storage is 
mayor issue (pers.com., Sakari, 2015). Additional holding facilities are rented or underwater 
storage is used, and additional machines are hired to stack the timber in higher piles than 
before (pers.com., Oscarson, 2015). It should be noted that these extra costs of the driving, 
storage, and labor are passed on to the forest owner, who sold the timber (pers.com., Henckel, 
2015; pers.com.,Sakari, 2015). The timber and pulpwood that is processed loses very little 
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 value when comparing storm-felled and regular felled timber (pers.com., Oscarson, 2015). 
This also means that the processing costs for the mills change very little (pers.com., 
Nordqvist, 2015). The extra costs for the mills are for machinery to water the logs, to make 
the log piles higher, extra storage, and slightly more fuel and labor costs due to distances to 
different storage places (ibid.). If measured per m3 these costs are relatively small. 
 
Before a storm, mills use their capacity to the fullest (pers.com., Sakari, 2015). Some of 
the timber that is processed is imported from other forest owners or other regions. After a 
storm the mills focus on the available timber in that specific region. Thus saw mills are 
operating at maximum speed all the time, thus there is no extra output after storms (pers.com., 
Nordqvist, 2015). If there is change in output, it generally decreases (pers.com., Blixt, 2015). 
 
5. Further processing, manufacturing, transportation and sales 
 
After the timber and pulpwood is processed in the mills, it is transported for further 
processing. Because the output of the mills has not changed, the transportation expenses 
remain the same (pers.com., Blixt, 2015). The most crucial point is to plan the change point 
where whole trees are switched with storm-felled trees, so that the mills do not run out of 
wood (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015). Additionally there is a need to coordinate the harvesting 
and transportation teams, but other than there is no further impact that goes outside processing 
(pers.com., Sakari, 2015).  Because there is a lot of wood on the market, the price of it goes 
down – thus it becomes easy to supply mills with raw materials, and it becomes good for the 
economy if the short run (pers.com., Sakari, 2015). This price decrease is for raw materials, 
while the price for processed materials is affected very little. Otherwise further processing 
costs do not change (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015). By the time the product is made and is sold 
to wholesalers the effect that a storm have on forests are not noticeable. This means that all of 
the processing and manufacturing actors in the chain have absorbed the shock completely 
(pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015).  
 
4.3 Similarities and Differences of Cases 
 
As described in the previous chapter – the impact of a storm is particularly tough on the 
start of the forestry supply chain. This chapter will outline the reactions of each of the forestry 
companies. The reactions are very similar in many ways, with small distinctions. The reaction 
of each of the forestry companies is described, with a summary of the similar and different 
approaches at the end of the chapter. 
 
4.3.1 Norrskog 
 
After a storm hits, there are two things that are initially done. Firstly a coordinating 
group is set up within the company – which is responsible for timing all of the activities, 
pricing the services and gathering information (pers.com., Falkeström, 2015). The second 
thing that is done – contact is established with all of the members of the organization to check 
if anybody needs immediate assistance or consultation (pers.com., Henckel, 2015). 
Afterwards there are a number of activities that the group implements: 
 
• Existing contracts with forest owners are put on hold, to free up machinery and limit 
the amount of timber and pulpwood that is sent to the mills (pers.com., Falkeström, 
2015); 
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 • Regional forest officers are contacted to gather information on how much storm-
felled timber is there on the fields. These officers continuously report the amount and 
species at a given location (pers.com., Henckel, 2015);  
• To gather more information some areas can be surveyed via planes or helicopters, 
while other areas are surveyed with the help of the forest owner (pers.com., 
Bergman, 2015); 
• The members are forbidden to cut trees in their properties, as there would be limited 
capacity to work with that timber or pulpwood. This is an important point, as forest 
owners tend to want to cut trees in spars locations after storms – thus some 
negotiation is necessary (pers.com., Falkeström, 2015). 
 
After information is gathered on the amounts of storm-felled timber, and there is a 
rough general idea of approximately how much storm-felled wood is there. Then other 
activities can be implemented: 
 
• Contact other saw mills in different regions and gather information, on possibilities 
of selling raw materials (ibid.); 
• Forest working teams with machinery from other regions are coordinated to assist in 
harvesting and transporting (ibid.); 
• Extra contractors are taken in to assist in harvesting and transporting. These 
contractors are also coordinated from the same group that is set up to deal with the 
storms fallout (pers.com., Falkeström, 2015; pers.com., Henckel, 2015); 
• Extra storage space is leased to store logs (pers.com., Falkeström, 2015; pers.com., 
Henckel, 2015); 
• Special machinery is hired to stack logs in higher piles at the existing storage space 
(pers.com., Oscarson, 2015); 
• The mills would start working every second Saturday (ibid.); 
• New contracts are made with the forest owners on the harvesting of the logs 
(pers.com., Falkeström, 2015); 
• The group would meet up every second week to discuss and share newest 
information on how much storm-felled logs are on the field, the capacity of the 
machinery, and transportation (pers.com., Falkeström, 2015; pers.com., Oscarson, 
2015); 
 
 The only long run solution on how to improve dealing storm fallout is by educating the 
forest owners on what to do after storm (pers.com., Henckel, 2015). Proper forest 
management is necessary so that the forests are resistant to storm impacts. Thus a possible 
solution is to create a manual for forest owners – on being active in nursing the forests, 
putting the right action at the right time to get maximum value (pers.com., Falkeström, 2015).  
 
4.3.2. SCA 
 
The first thing that is done - a reaction group is established. This group meets once 
every week and shares information on capacity and information from the field. A plan is made 
for the activities for the coming week until the next meeting. The activities that are done:  
 
• The forests are surveyed by a survey team. To get a general idea of the degree of 
damage the forests are surveyed by planes and helicopters (pers.com., Bergman, 
2015); 
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 • Capacity is planned in terms of harvesting, transporting, mill processing capabilities 
and storage. The information on these capabilities is updated every week (pers.com., 
Sakari, 2015); 
• Extra attention is given to the “change point” where whole trees are switched with 
windfall trees, so that the mills do not run out of logs (ibid.); 
• Additional teams that work with transportation and forest work are hired from other 
regions or other sources. These teams are then coordinated by the group that meets 
once a week (ibid.); 
• Imports of wood from other regions are discontinued (ibid.); 
• Extra storing facilities are rented, as well as extra machinery that allows for higher 
stockpiling of logs (ibid.); 
• Renegotiations of agreements with independent forest owners who have contracts 
with SCA (ibid.); 
• Negotiations with governmental agencies are done to increase the allowed truck 
driving hours per day and the allowed load of a single truck (ibid.); 
• Create incentives for voluntary weekend driving (ibid.). 
 
Because SCA is a company, not a forest owner association, it does not have to spend as 
much time in creating contracts and getting consent with regards to working on their own 
land. There is still a sizeable amount of contract with independent local forest owners.  As for 
possible future improvements - thinning practices and planting practices can be improved by 
consulting with forest owners. That is the limit of possible actions to improve forest 
susceptibility to storms (pers.com., Sakari, 2015). 
 
4.3.3. Södra 
 
The sequence of actions that is taken by Södra is similar to that of Norrskog and SCA. 
A group is set up whose responsibility is to deal with the fallout of the storm. There are two 
things that are initially done. Firstly they get in contact with all of the members who might be 
affected and ask if they need help in the form of consulting, or harvesting. Secondly they 
gather information on what kind and how many of logs are there (pers.com., Nordqvist, 
2015). This is done by contacting forest owners as well as having regional officers survey the 
forests. Afterwards a reaction plan is made with calculations of how much timber and pulp 
can be produced from the forests and how much can be processed by the plants. According to 
Calle Nordqvist (2015) and Johan Blixt (2015) the things that Södra can do is as follows: 
 
• Contracts with forest owners are put on hold; 
• Contact other saw mills in different regions and gather information, on possibilities 
of selling raw materials; 
• Forest working teams and transportation trucks are moved from other regions to 
work with storms affected forests. If necessary additional teams can be hired form 
other sources. 
• Extra storage space is leased to store logs; 
• Special machinery is hired to stack logs in higher piles at the existing storage spaces; 
• Negotiations happen with the forest owners as they want Södra to harvest more logs 
than is just the storm-felled ones as some areas will be left very spars. Forest owners 
are asked to wait until the all of the storm-felled logs are processed. 
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 • Meetings take place every week, where information on capacity, inventory and 
harvested logs is shared. Every week a plan is made for the next week, when 
information is shared again, and the plan is updated. 
 
According to Calle Nordqvist (2015) long run improvement can be done, by improving 
forest management practices and educating forest owners. If forests are managed properly, 
they are more resistant to wind damage as well as give higher yields, and are thus more 
profitable. 
 
 An aspect that has to be taken in to account is that Södra is a market price setter in the 
region that it operates in. This means that the organization is careful in changing the prices 
that it buys and sells logs for. The price setting is dependent on the degree of damage as well 
as the markets for processed timber and pulp products (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015). 
 
4.3.4 Similarities and Differences 
 
All three of the supply chains, with regards to storm management are highly dependent 
on the forestry companies. The three cases can be compared in two different ways. The first 
one is similarity in organization – how the forestry companies compare to each other in terms 
of size and activates. The second is in terms of what is similar in the reaction to how they 
handle the fallout of storms. 
 
Table 1 – Organizational similarities between Södra, Norrskog and SCA. 
 
 Södra Norrskog SCA 
Relationship 
with forest 
owners 
Forest owner 
economic 
association 
Forest owner 
economic 
association 
Forest owner / Company 
that buys logs from 
independent forest owners  
Total 
activities in 
Supply Chain 
Forestry, 
consulting, 
primary 
processing 
Forestry, 
consulting, 
primary 
processing 
Forest ownership, 
forestry, primary 
processing, secondary 
processing 
Number of pulp 
and saw mills 
owned 
12 saw mills 
3 pulp mills 
3 Sawmills 
2 Processing 
plants 
Works with 5 saw mills 
(owns 4) 
1 Paper mill 
 1 Pulp mill 
2 paper board mills 
Mechanization Harvesters and 
forwarders 
Harvesters and 
forwarders 
Harvesters and forwarders 
Transportation Outsourced Outsourced Outsourced 
Forest work Outsourced Outsourced Mostly outsourced/ some 
owned harvester and 
forwarders 
Contract length 
with forest 
owners 
5 years 3-5 years 3 years 
 
The reactions that the three organizations had to storms are similar to a high degree. 
Within all three of the organizations a reaction group is established, that deals with the fallout. 
This group then takes a series of actions that are centered on information gathering, capacity 
increasing, and negotiation. These are: 
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 • Information is gathered and shared in weekly meetings. Information from the field is 
gathered by planes / helicopters and by survey teams who report the amount and 
species of storm-felled logs. Information on capacity of mills, transportation, 
harvesters and forwarders is gathered and shared. 
• Capacity is increased by moving forestry teams and transportation from other regions 
(within the same organization), as well as by hiring external forestry teams. Extra 
storage capacity is rented. Machinery that allows more storage within existing 
facilities is rented. 
• Preventive actions are taken by negotiating with forest owners – to change contracts 
and to avoid more timber being cut. Timber is sold to other organizations, so that it 
does not lose quality from being in storage for too long. Negotiation happens with 
the government to relax some of the laws that restrict truck loads, driving hours and 
harvesting storm felled logs after end of June. 
 
It should be noted that the differences are minor. It is not mentioned during the 
interviews that Södra uses planes or helicopters for information gathering.  The frequency of 
meetings differs – once a week for Södra and SCA; once in two weeks for Norrskog. Apart 
from these small differences the actions taken are different only in scope – otherwise they are 
identical.  
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 5 Analysis and Discussion 
 
In this chapter the results of the interviews are analyzed and discussed. The chapter is 
divided into four parts – one to each respective research question, and one to the 
generalizability of the results.  Due to limited literature on the subject it is not possible to 
establish an expected result to compare to. This leads the analysis and the discussion being 
merged in to a single chapter. The start of each subchapter analyses the results on the 
particular research question, and ends with the statements that are available from the limited 
literature. 
 
As a reminder to the reader - the aim of this paper is to describe the costs or benefits and 
taken actions after storms within the forestry supply chain, in order to cover the gap in the 
academic literature.  This aim is covered by the three research questions, where the first one is 
about costs, the second one is on actions, and the third one is on benefactors of storms. 
 
5.1 First Research Questions 
 
Research Question 1: What costs do storms increase for forestry supply chains? 
 
As concluded from the interviews there are two cost types that are increased – the cost 
in log quality, and the costs of activities. As noted by Tommy Oscarson (2015): “The cost of 
having logs lying around far outweighs the costs of the operations, because afterwards the 
logs cannot be sold as fresh products”. Thus the forest companies take up activities to 
minimize the costs of bark beetles, mold and rot decreasing the quality of logs. The activities 
that forest companies take up are harvesting and processing the storm-felled timber before the 
loss of quality is noticeable. If managed correctly there are very small and limiter losses of 
quality from storm felled timber after storms (pers.com., Huittinen, 2015). The activities that 
become more costly in descending order are: 
 
• Harvesting (manufacturing) costs – Because of the decreased efficiency of harvesters 
and forwarders on the field, this is the biggest cost increase in the supply chain. The 
efficiency of harvesting decreases by 30% to 50% depending on the specifics of the 
forest stand (pers.com., Falkstrom, 2015); 
• Inventory costs – storing the logs in additional terminals increases inventory costs. 
Storage in these additional terminals is more costly compared to storing them in the 
mill storage, as the distance to the mill is greater, thus there is decreasing efficiency 
(pers.com., Blixt, 2015). It should be noted that storage involves watering the logs, 
so that to maintain the quality for mills; 
• Transportation and labor costs – the cost increases in labor and transportation are 
generally small if calculated per m3. This is because the additional labor and 
transportation services that are brought in and hired replace the existing labor and 
transport providers. The cost increases come from having to hire additional labor 
which is generally more costly than existing providers, thus the costs increase 
slightly (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015; pers.com., Sakari, 2015). It should be noted that 
the efficiency of transportation and labor is addressed in manufacturing and 
inventory costs. 
 
The other costs that are noted by Chopra and Meindl (2013) - replenishment lead time, 
relationships across the supply chain, product availability are unaffected. Because the mills 
26 
 
 keep working at full capacity, just as before, replenishment lead time and product availability 
are unchanged. Relationships across the supply chain largely remain unchanged (pers.com., 
Nordqvist, 2015). Because all parties are interested in maintaining a long-term relationship, 
there are generally little problems in negotiations (pers.com., Bergman, 2015). Regarding cost 
of quality of timber – they strongly depend on how well the fallout from the storm is 
managed. Processing costs for mills remain unchanged, but the quality of output depends on 
the quality of raw materials. If properly managed the quality loss of timber is negligible 
(pers.com., Huittinen, 2015). If the storm fallout is not properly managed then the costs of 
quality could be higher, but this has not been the case with regards to storm in 2013. 
 
An important factor which should be regarded in costs is that the biggest part is born by 
the forest owners. These costs are experienced through the decreased price that the forest 
owners have to sell their logs for. Because the forest owner takes the hit for the decreased 
efficiency of harvesting, 90% to 95% of the total losses of the chain fall on the forest owners, 
or insurers (pers.com., Henckel, 2015). The additional costs that are experienced by the rest of 
the chain are with regards to storage, slightly increased labor and transportation costs, as well 
as possible quality losses – these are small compared to the losses born by forest owners 
(pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015). 
 
When discussing the nominal size of the costs, the individual situations are not 
generalizable. Every storm is unique – there is no unique manual to follow, thus the costs in 
nominal terms can differ wildly for each specific situation (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015). 
Every extra unit of storm felled logs increases costs non-linearly based on location and degree 
of damage, thus the discussed numbers are not relevant for future estimates, and would only 
serve as an illustration of the moment (pers.com., Sakari, 2015). 
 
Regarding the literature on the subject of costs – the different possible costs discussed 
by Chopra and Meindl (2013) were relevant to different degrees. The cost increases of 
transport, labor, inventory and manufacturing (harvesting and processing) are highly relevant 
to the case, and crucial to making the interview structure. The cost points of product 
availability and replenishment lead time were not relevant in terms of being a source for costs 
in the supply chain. Product availability – in terms of how many different kinds of products 
are available - is completely unaffected. The cost point of “relationships across the chain” is 
highly relevant when discussing the renegotiation of existing contracts between forestry 
companies and forest owners. Such type of costs are not observed in chain, because the 
involved parties are oriented towards long-term relationships (pers.com., Bergman, 2015; 
pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015), it should reminded that the interviews happened with consent on 
transparency. According to Robson (2011) transparency can affect results, by having the 
interviewees avoiding to say anything negative about other parties. This should be taken in to 
account when evaluating the results. 
 
An additional cost that is mentioned by Chopra and Meindl, as well as many other 
sources – is the bullwhip effect. This occurs when the supply chain in uncoordinated and 
information in not properly shared (Chopra & Meindl, 2013; Whang et al., 1997). This is not 
observed to be an issue that the forestry supply chain had to deal with before or after the 
storm. This is because the output of mills is stable regardless of storms (pers.com., Huittinen, 
2015; pers.com., Oscarsson, 2015). This means that in the supply chain after the mills, the 
coordination is simpler and more predictable. Meanwhile the actors in the supply chain before 
the mill are working with minimizing storage costs before storms, and minimizing quality loss 
costs after storms.  In both cases the bullwhip effect is not observed. 
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Regarding quality losses to products – from the literature review according to 
Hanewinkel and Peyron (2013) the main losses from storms are from the reduced market 
value of logs “whose mechanical properties have been damaged”. This is found to be partially 
true. As this can be a very big costs for the supply chain, but that does not mean it necessarily 
is. To quote Ville Huittinen (2015):”If storm fallout is properly managed the quality loss of 
logs is negligible”. This statement from Hanewinkel and Peyron (2013) is true to the extent 
that part of the supply chain refocuses on minimizing losses from possible quality loss. This 
refocus is mentioned by Broman et al. (2009). In the work of Broman et al. (2009) 
transportation is noted as the most complex and constraining issue. While transportation costs 
do increase slightly, the losses from it per m3 are not as noticeable as from harvesting. This 
could be because losses from logistics can be influenced by management decisions, while 
losses from harvesting cannot be influenced. 
 
5.2 Second Research Questions 
 
Research Question 2: What actions are taken within the forestry supply chain to 
minimize the costs from storms? 
 
To restate the point made by Tommy Oscarson (2015): “The cost of having logs lying 
around far outweighs the costs of the operations, because afterwards the logs cannot be sold 
as fresh products”. This means that the forestry companies’ act in a way to minimize the cost 
associated with loss of quality of logs. A similarity in all three cases is that a working group is 
created within the organization that would deal with the fallout of storms. The activities taken 
by these companies would then reduce the impact for the rest of the forestry supply chain. 
The actions that are taken by within the forestry supply chain are as follow: 
 
• Existing contracts with forest owners are renegotiated. Contracts for clearing a forest 
stand are made for a period of 3 to 5 years (with some exceptions that are faster), and 
after a storm, to free up capacity, it is more costly in the long run to work on standing 
forests than on storm felled ones (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015; pers.com., Sakari, 
2015; pers.com., Henckel, 2015). Thus negotiations happen with the contracted 
forest owners to put off the arrangement; 
• Labor and transport capacity is increased. This is done by bringing in forest workers 
and trucks that work in other regions, as well as employing other transportation 
methods such as railways and seaways (pers.com., Söderström, 2015). Firstly 
internal resources are “moved around” and afterwards external sources are used to 
make up for decreased capacity (ibid.); 
• Additional terminals to store storm-felled logs are rented in all cases. This is because 
the existing mills are equipped to store raw materials so that the mill could process 
them in around one week (pers.com., Huittinen, 2015); 
• Machinery for improving storage efficiency in existing storage space is rented 
(pers.com., Blixt, 2015; pers.com., Huittinen , 2015; pers.com., Oscarsson, 2015). 
• Logs are sold to other mills. Depending on the market prices of logs and 
transportation costs, logs are sold to other mills. Alternatively this would increase 
storage costs, to maintain the quality of the logs until the existing mill could process 
the logs (pers.com., Blixt, 2015; pers.com., Huittinen, 2015; pers.com., Oscarsson, 
2015); 
• Negotiations are done with governmental agencies on restrictions. There are multiple 
restricts that limit the efficiency of the supply chain. These are the restrictions on the 
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 driving capacity of trucks, the allowed driving hours of truck drivers as well as the 
restriction that all storm-felled timber has to left lying in the forest after the end of 
June until next year. The restriction on truck driving, both hours and capacity, were 
relaxed for month after the storms in 2013. The restriction on lying forests were 
relaxed after Storm Gudrun in 2005 (Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological 
Institute, 2011; pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015). 
 
It should be noted that the choice of activities that are implemented depend on each 
specific storm. The activities listed above are the ones that were implemented after the storms 
of late 2013.  For different storms, circumstances might differ, and some of the 
aforementioned activities would not be implemented (pers.com., Nordqvist, 2015; pers.com., 
Sakari, 2015; pers.com., Henckel, 2015). 
 
As an additional actor whose activities are worth mentioning is the government of 
Sweden influences the process through regulations. Examples of this are the regulations 
regarding collection of storm felled timber and limited driving hours for truck drivers. This 
means that these results are limited to Sweden, as different countries can have different 
regulations. Otherwise the government’s role in the supply chain is minuscule. 
 
Some of the activities are mentioned in the literature by Broman et al. (2009). The 
activities that are mentioned are information gathering after storms, capacity building in terms 
of forestry work, transportation, storage and sales of logs to other mills. The activities that are 
not mentioned are renegotiation of contracts, machinery for increasing storage efficiency, and 
negotiations with governmental agencies. The process of how storms are generally managed 
has not been explicitly documented. For this reason the author proposes a model in Figure 3 
to explain the process.  
 
 
The proposed model shown in Figure 3 is a simple explanation of how storms are 
managed. It is based on the information gathered from the interviews. This is described more 
in detail under heading 5.4 Generalizations The activities that are done within capacity 
building are described in chapter 5.1 “Analysis” under the 2nd research question. 
Information Gathering 
Capacity Building 
Fallout Depleted Storm 
Figure 3 – Illustration of the storm fallout management process; 
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The actions described in Figure 3 happen in all three cases. All three supply chains 
started to work with the fallout by forming a managing group which works by continuously 
collecting information and then using it to adjust capacity. This is done until all of the fallout 
is managed and the arrangements for its usage are made. The specific actions that are taken 
are described at the start of this subchapter. The model is necessary to fill the gap of lack of 
literature on how fallout from storms is managed. The model is also generalizable to forestry 
management chains further than Sweden because it omits the specific actions taken, and just 
focuses on how forestry companies deal with storm fallout. More is discussed in subchapter 
5.4 Generalizability.  
 
5.3 Third Research Questions 
 
 Research Question 3: Which parts of the supply chain profit in the short run from 
shocks caused by storms? 
 
During the interviews with different parts of the supply chain all of the interviewees 
stated that there are no parties who profit from storms in a way that would be significant. This 
applies to both, the short-run and the long-run. The losses are outlined under the first research 
question – there are parts of the chain the benefit in some form, while not making increased 
profits. The contracted forestry workers and transportation companies, while not making any 
increased profit, have a guaranteed flow of work for a significant amount of time (pers.com., 
Henckel, 2015). The biggest benefactor of storms, while not gaining profit on it, is the 
forestry industry which uses processed wood products (pers.com., Sakari, 2015). After a 
storm there is an implicit guarantee that there will be a steady surplus of processed wood 
products, thus the manufacturers have a more predictable source (pers.com., Falkeström, 
2015). Lastly it should be noted that while none of the parties in the supply chain profit from 
the shock to the supply chain, the economy as whole gains, as all of the activities to mitigate 
storm damage, listed under the second research question, increase GDP (pers.com., Sakari, 
2015).  
 
To sum up with a quote from Henrik Sakari (2015): “There are no winners from a 
storm, but some are bigger losers than other. The forest owner gets less, the insurer loses, and 
the harvesting becomes more costly. With all of the wood on the market the price goes down 
– thus it becomes easy to supply the industry and it becomes good for the economy”. 
 
Regarding the third research question on possible profits in parts of the supply chain, it 
is now safe to say that no part of the supply chain profits from storm. The brief possibility 
mentioned by Hanewinkel and Peyron (2013) that forest loggers or nurseries profit from 
storms has been proven untrue. Forest loggers gain in terms of stability of work, as the shock 
from the storm guarantees work for a significant amount of time – while no noteworthy costs 
increases have been reported by any of the interviewees. Seedling producers pointed out that 
there is lag of 1 to 2 years between a storm felling a tree and time when that forest stand is 
replanted (pers.com., Andersson, 2015). This leads to increased short-term demand after those 
1 to 2 years, but it is done on the account of that same stand being felled at a later time – 
meaning that the produced seedlings that were meant for regular felled forest stands now go 
to storm felled forest stands (ibid.). This can also be confirmed by the reaction groups that 
work with storm felled timber – the seedling producers are not a part of the group that get 
information and it is pointed out that they do not need to be (pers.com., Andersson, 2015; 
pers.com., Sakari, 2015).   
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 Another theory that helps explain the activities in supply chain is the notion of push 
and pull. Defined in Chopra and Meindl (2013) these can be distinguished by either predicting 
customer demand or by reacting to it. According to Tommy Oscarson and Olof Falkeström 
(2015), during status quo the forestry supply chain has a pull position. Mills work at full 
output and the stock of logs near mills is necessary only as precaution. The shock created by 
storm forces the forestry supply chain to take a push position.  
 
5.4 Generalization 
 
This subchapter addresses the generalization and the external validity of the 
conclusions. This is done to thoroughly address the different parts that can be generalized to a 
different extent. As noted by Robson (2011) there are three degrees of generalization that 
should be taken in to account - industry wise, country wise and to other research field. 
 
External validity is an important factor in to determine to what extent the results can be 
expected to be the same in different situations (Shadish et al., 2002).  The process of working 
with fallout from storms is impacted by multiple factors that could be specific to Sweden, 
such as price and availability of different services, demand for processed timber and the role 
of the government. These limitations apply to apply to all specific taken actions, cost 
distributions and possible profits. This means that the results of this work can be generalized 
only to the forestry supply chains, as no other supply chains are analyzed, and only to 
Sweden.  
 
An exception to this rule is the model illustrated in Figure 3. This model is simplified to 
illustrate the continuous process of working the fallout of storms. Because it leaves out 
specifics and only describes the general actions of the process, this model can be generalized 
to any forestry supply chain that would choose work with the fallout from storms. The 
country limitation does not apply only to this model. 
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 6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter concludes the research done in this paper. This includes briefly describing 
the methodology, the answers to the research questions, achievement of the aim and 
suggestions for further studies. 
 
Storms are a significant impact on forestry supply chains. In the end of 2013, Sweden is 
hit by numerous storms that caused damage to forests. Because the forestry supply chains 
reaction to storms, has not well documented in academic literature, this provided a good 
opportunity to research the reaction of the forestry supply chain. Case studies of three forestry 
supply chain are done and interviews are made with people in key positions in different parts 
of the chain. The most significant part of the chain, that deals with the shocks of storms are 
the forestry companies, who have been the main source of data. The forestry supply chain 
involves forest owners, forest workers who do felling and thinning, transportation, forestry 
companies, pulp and saw mills, secondary processors in the end retailers. The shock is 
absorbed by the forest owners and the forestry companies. The pulp and saw mills deal with 
extra storage, but the output does not change notably – thus after the secondary processors the 
impact of storms is generally not noticeable. 
 
Research Question 1: What costs do storms increase for forestry supply chains? 
 
The shock from a storm creates a tradeoff for the forest owner and forestry company – 
the storm-felled logs lose quality if they are not harvested after the storms. Harvesting the 
storm-felled logs is less efficient than harvesting fresh logs because it is more time consuming 
and not as concentrated, thus more costly. The costs of quality loss far outweigh the costs of 
reduced efficiency of harvesting, thus there is adjustment to work with storm-felled timber. 
The main costs, which the storms increase, are harvesting costs, because of reduced 
efficiency, inventory costs, because storm-felled logs have to be stored, and slight increases to 
labor and transportation costs. These increased costs come from the activities to minimize the 
possible losses from quality, and these activities are related to increasing capacity to work 
with storm-felled logs.  
 
Research Question 2: What actions are taken within the forestry supply chain to 
minimize the costs from storms? 
 
The forestry companies are the main actors in dealing with the storm-felled logs. In the 
three cases that are looked at all of these activities are present, while in slightly different 
extents. The reaction of the forestry companies starts by establishing a working group that 
would deal with the fallout of the storm. This group would then gather data on the species and 
amount of specific logs at specific areas. This would be done by either survey teams on the 
ground or by aerial surveillance. Information is continuously gathered as the storm-felled logs 
are harvested. There are a number of actions that the forestry companies can take, mainly 
capacity building and negotiating.  Capacity building refers to hiring additional working 
teams, harvesters, inventory and machinery, while negotiating refers to selling the logs to 
other mills, postponing existing contracts with forest owners, and communicating with 
governmental agencies on capacity restrictions. 
 
Research Question 3: Which parts of the supply chain profit in the short run from 
shocks caused by storms? 
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 It is concluded that no part of the chain profits from the shock created by a storm. 
However there are some actors in the chain that benefit. Firstly the forestry workers and 
transporters who are hired as extra capacity gain certainty of employment until the fallout of 
the storm has been gathered. Secondly the industries that rely on processed wood products 
have an implicit guarantee that there will not be a shortage of raw materials. Lastly, due to 
increased economic activity a countries GDP increases. The losses are taken by the forest 
owners and insurance companies because of the reduced price of logs. 
 
There are three main contributions of this paper to the academic literature. Firstly it is 
the list of activities taken in the forestry supply chains in Sweden in order to minimize cost 
and a description of the costs. Secondly it is the map of the Swedish forestry supply chain 
illustrated in Figure 2 – it is based on the work of Haartveit et al. (2004), and uses the same 
method, while being a simplified in order to better show the effects of storms. Lastly it is the 
framework of dealing with the fallout from storms illustrated in Figure 3. It shows the 
approach that the forestry companies used. These three contributions are the key elements in 
achieving the aim of this paper. 
 
The aim of this paper is to describe the costs (or benefits) and taken actions after storms 
within the forestry supply chain, in order to cover the gap in academic literature. The 
aforementioned conclusions are drawn from the three cases of supply chain. The aim has been 
achieved to the extent that the conclusions are generalizable within Sweden, with the 
exception of the model which describes the continuous process of working the fallout (Figure 
2).   
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 7 Epilogue 
 
During the interview process of research multiple issues reoccurred that are unrelated to 
the main body of research. These issues might be of interest for future studies and / or inquiry. 
These issues are related to climate change, forecasting, hiring and long term impacts.  
 
Questions regarding climate change are brought up at the end of some interviews after 
the topic of general improvement from forestry management. An argument that is pointed out 
by Sverker Henckel (2015) that forest structures are changing noticeably quicker than the 
environment. This is evident by changing forestry management practices in some regions 
(was not specified in which regions) – which leads to an inquiry that is not found often in the 
literature: ”How are management practices changing?”.   
 
A point that is made by multiple interviewees is that long-term forecasting is not 
practiced in the industry precisely because of natural disasters. According to Henrik Sakari, 
2015 and Olof Falkeström this is due to reasons of low predictability and because there are no 
tools that would help protect a forest even if it is known that a storm would hit a specific area. 
This is best summed up by a quote from Calle Nordqvist (2015): “We just assume that there 
are storms every other year”. This leads to a question which should be answered within a 
completely different field – can anything be done to prevent storm damage to a forest, even 
with accurate forecasts? 
 
Outsourcing is common practice in the industry – as can be seen by the three forestry 
companies. While transportation is easily outsourced because of competition and easy 
adjustment, forestry worked is less flexible. This issue could be seen as a minor suggestion to 
all of the forestry companies for future improvement. While none of the three cases had 
problems with outsourcing forestry work, the way additional forestry work is found is through 
industry knowledge of the right people at the right place. If there is an unsystematic way of 
solving these issues, it leads to risk. If the employees change within the forestry company, a 
chance exists that somebody without such industry contacts would have to solve the same 
problem. The solution from such an employee might take more time or additional expenses, 
thus leading to losses. Therefore the suggestion is to have more systematic way of hiring 
external contractors.  
 
Interviewees from all three forestry companies noted that as a long term improvement 
the only thing that can be done in better and more educated forest management – to do the 
right thing at the right time.  In the last ten years, since storm Gudrun, there has also been 
increased awareness of storms in forestry management (pers.com., Henckel, 2015).  All of 
this means that the field of forestry management adjusting, while the academic literature on 
the subject is slowly catching up. Lastly a thank you should be said to all of the participants in 
this research for educating the author with respect to forestry management as well as for the 
insight in to the unpredictable. 
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 Appendix 1: Types of material flows 
 
Material Flow Illustration Material Flow Type Description Examples 
 
V-type 
(Mattsson, 1999) 
(Ferguson & 
MacBeth, 1994) 
(Burbidge, 1994) 
Diverging flows involve 
partitioning or splitting the 
raw material into a number 
of products. 
The breakdown 
operation in lumber 
production 
 
A-type (Mattsson, 
1999) 
(Ferguson & 
MacBeth, 1994) 
(Burbidge, 1994) 
Converging flows refer to 
situations where several raw 
materials end up in 
significantly lesser amounts 
of end products 
Assembly operations in 
general: 
- Assembly of 
computers 
- Assembly of 
furniture 
 
T-type (Mattsson, 
1999) 
(Ferguson & 
MacBeth, 1994) 
 
The T-type is where a small 
number of raw materials end 
up as a larger number of end 
products. The number of 
converging points increases 
as focus is moved 
downstream in the supply 
chain. 
The paper industry 
utilizes only a few 
ingredients, but a large 
number of paper 
qualities and types can 
be produced. 
 
X-type (Mattsson, 
1999) 
The x-type is characterized 
by a large number of raw 
materials that converge into 
lesser number of parts or 
modules that can be 
combined into a multitude of 
end products. 
Use of modules makes 
it possible to create a 
multitude of products 
from a  moderate 
number of parts: 
- Automotive 
industry 
- Manufacturing of 
kitchen cabinets 
 
I-type  (Mattsson, 
1999) 
(Ferguson & 
MacBeth, 1994) 
(Burbidge, 1994) 
The I-type has one raw 
material that ends up as one 
final product. Typically, this 
is true for separation 
processes, or processes 
where the raw materials is 
shaped into a product. 
Lumber manufacturing. 
Figure 1. Types of material flows and their characteristics. Created by Haartveit et al. (2004) 
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 Appendix 2 - Semi structured interview plan 
 
Topics:  
1. Map of the supply chain 
2. Storms and their effects  
3. Costs 
4. Reaction (information sharing, extra capacity, etc.) 
The interviewee is reminded that they can refuse to answer if the answer involves trade or 
competitive secrets. Recording is done for personal use. The final version will be sent for 
approval. Start with personal questions – position, experience and current events. 
At the end – ask if I have missed any important factors in understanding how storms affected 
the company in 2013. In the end ask for contacts regarding the other parts of the supply chain. 
1. Map of the supply chain 
What is your role in the supply chain? (What do you do; what are you responsible for?) 
Could you outline the full supply chain of your organization? What part of the supply chain is 
owned by your organization, and what part is owned by others? 
What activities are outsourced? (Logging, transportation, etc.) 
How are goods transported within the supply chain?  (Ask again later after storms) 
From what activities does your organizations revenue come? (Log sales; lumber sales; real 
estate; retail; pulp/paper sales; etc.)  
What kind of raw materials and services does the organization buy? 
How many companies are you buying your supplies from? (How many companies are before 
you in the supply chain?) 
How much % of all sales is to the largest customer? (Not needed to disclose who the customer 
is) 
2. Storms and their effects 
Within 2013 and 2014, was the company affected by storms? 
How did the company react? What actions were taken? 
What activities do the storms force the organization to do? 
What was done with the damaged timber? (How was it arranged? How was it handled?) 
Does the degree of damage differ? How? 
How did the storm affect operations? (Were some things postponed/ hurried?) 
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 How do storms affect existing contracts? (How does the company deal with felling contracts 
for the period?)  
How was capacity affected at different points in the supply chain? 
Did the company have extra capacity before the storm? (In terms of available workforce, 
technology for felling and transportation, etc.) 
What actions were taken to improve capacity at chokepoints during storms? 
3. Costs 
How did coordination happen during and after the storm? (What was the chain of actions how 
the organization reacts?) 
How did each of these costs change because of the storms:  
• Manufacturing cost (costs of harvesting; processing timber) 
• Inventory costs (holding more inventory) 
• Transportation costs (because surplus needs to be maintained) 
• Labor costs (were more people hired?) 
 
Could you explain the reasons for these cost changes? 
How did the relationships with other companies change? 
How did the delivery times change? 
Were the previously agree upon orders delivered?  
Does any part of the supply chain benefit from storms? (If yes, how?) 
4. Reaction 
Does collaboration happen with other organizations in the supply chain during storms? (If 
yes, how?) 
In your personal opinion, how would sharing information on the damages of storms change 
relationships and costs in the supply chain? (This question is asked if not previously 
answered) 
How does forecasting happen? 
How was forecasting adjusted after the storms? 
Were there any lessons learnt / preparation made for the future, after the storm? 
How did you receive the information about the storm? How predictable are storms? 
What did your organization do “good” (well) and what could have been done better with 
regards to working with the consequences of a storm? 
41 
 
 Appendix 3 – Interviewee list 
 
Name Description Contact information 
Jörgen Andersson Chief of Norrplant - supplies seedlings to 
SCA and Norrskog 
jorgen.andersson.skog@sca.com 
060-59 41 72 
Lars Bergman Independent forest owner who has 
experienced storms in his forests 
- 
Johan Blixt Platschef, Södra Timber Långasjö 0471-509 27 
Olof Falkeström Norrskog, Skogschef,  olof.falkestrom@norrskog.se 
0612-71 87 81 
Sverker Henckel Norrskog, Skogsrådgivare Medelpad 
Östra 
Sverker.henckel@norrskog.se 
060-16 72 80 
Ville Huittinen SCA Timber, Råvaruchef 070 398 59 02  
Calle Nordqvist Södra, Regionchef, Södra  Skogs region 
syd 
calle.nordqvist@sodra.com 
0454-59 801 
Tommy Oscarsson Norrskog, Östavall Millmanager  tommy.oscarsson@norrskog.se 
0690-524 08 
Henrik Sakari SCA, Kundförsörjningschef henrik.sakari@sca.com 
060-19 32 10 
Olov Söderström Norrskog, Virkeschef olov.soderstrom@norrskog.se 
0612-71 87 70 
 
The contact information of all the interviewees is listed above. The contact information 
is taken from public sources. Private contact information is not disclosed because of ethical 
considerations described in chapter 3.3. The contact information of Lars Bergman is not given 
as per request – to confirm interview status please contact Henrik Sakari from SCA. 
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